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This Note examines whether Saudi Arabia’s adoption of the New York Convention will ad-
vance the successful use of international arbitration by non-Saudi Arabian investors. Part I pro-
vides a background of the New York Convention, its purpose, and its historical application in the
United States and the Middle Eastern countries of Kuwait and Syria. Part II examines the conflict
between the Saudi Arabian legal system and Saudi Arabia’s adoption of the New York Convention.
Part III argues that Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention allows a country with a unique
legal system, such as Saudi Arabia, to give the appearance of embracing the international commu-
nity, while permitting that country to reject arbitral awards that are contrary to its public policy.
Part III also recommends possible modifications to Article V(2)(b) in order to prevent countries
from refusing to enforce non-domestic arbitral awards. This Note concludes that the modification
of Article V(2)(b) will prevent the circumvention of the New York Convention’s objectives and
promote a uniform set of rules governing non-domestic arbitral awards.
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND SAUDI ARABIA: CAN
A COUNTRY USE THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
TO REFUSE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-
DOMESTIC ARBITRAL AWARDS?
Kristin T. Roy*
"Be wary of the man who urges an action in which he himself
incurs no risk."**
INVTRODUCTION
On April 19, 1994, Saudi Arabia acceded to the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("Convention" or "New York Convention").' Upon adoption,
Saudi Arabia became the ninety-fourth party to the Convention,2
which requires all signatories to recognize the arbitration agree-
ments and awards' issued by other member nations.4 Saudi Ara-
bia adopted the New York Convention to increase its role in the
modem international community.5
With the decreased threat of war in the Middle East,6 inves-
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
** GiovAcHwo SErANTI, CENTELIAS DE VARIOS CONCEPTOS.
1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see
International LegalFramework, 1 WoRLD ARB. RsP. 1, 37 (1994) (listing accession dates for
all New York Convention signatories).
2. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Saudis
Accept New York Convention, Disp. REs. J., June 1994, at 26 [hereinafter Saudis Accept].
3. Michael H. StrubJr., ReistingEnforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards underArtice V
(1)(E) and Article 1W of the New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective Guidelines, 68 TEx.
L. REy. 1031, 1031 (1990). In the international arena, these awards often must be re-
duced to judgments in the enforcing jurisdiction before they can be executed. Id. An
arbitration award is the written resolution of a dispute by a disinterested party. BLAcK's
LAw DIcrioNRY 137 (6th ed. 1990).
4. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40 (discussing purpose of New York Convention).
5. John C. Hoppe, Saudi Arabia, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusINESS IN Tm MID-
DIE EAsr 157, 192 (Dennis Cambeli ed., 1986). Saudi Arabia is adopting long term,
comprehensive international development plans in the hope of increasing its presence
in the modern world. Id. at 157. "Foreign investors will find a regulatory regime that is
being gradually liberalized and a commercial law system that is still developing....
Commercial rules and regulations continue to be expanded, strengthened and regular-
ized." Investing in Saudi Arabia: Rules, Practices, Trends, MMDzt E. ExEc. R.x.,Jan. 1991,
at 18.
6. Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage
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tors are realizing sound financial reasons for investing in coun-
tries such as Saudi Arabia.' The Middle East offers investors a
skilled and educated labor pool,8 inexpensive labor prices,9
unexplored markets,10 citizens demanding imports, " and large
numbers of consumers with high spending power.1 2 These man-
ufacturing incentives, coupled with Saudi Arabia's vast oil and
natural gas resources," have increased non-domestic investor in-
terest in Saudi Arabia.14 Nonetheless, investors have been hesi-
tant to contract within Saudi Arabia due to Saudi Arabia's favor-
itism toward its own agencies and rejection of international dis-
pute resolution methods.1 5 The Saudi Arabian government
U.S. Enterprises to Invest in Arab-IsraeliJoint Ventures, 15 MICH.J. INT'L L 405, 413 (1994).
"[T]he first rays of peace have begun to shine on the region." Id.
7. Id.; see Douglas Davis, Lebanon Wll Recover with Peace, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 18,
1993, at 14 (indicating that economic recovery has accelerated now that peace has set-
tled on region); see also Peter Passel, Economic Sce: The Paletinians May Now Have a
Chance to Spur Their Economy, N.Y. TnEs, Sept. 23, 1993, at D2 (indicating that peace
and order could presage an economic blossoming in Palestine).
8. Lubetzky, supra note 6, at 413. Lubetzky indicates that Israel devotes approxi-
mately 25% of its budget to education. Id. Further, over 70% of Israel's work force has
completed more than eleven years of formal education. Id. at 413 n.31.
9. I. at 413 n.32. In 1983, the average cost of labor in Israel was less than one-half
the cost of comparable labor in the United States. Id.
10. Id. at 414.
11. Id. The oil-rich Arab nations have large populations with high levels of spend-
ing power. Id.
12. Id.; see Rafael Benvenisti, Israel's Foreign Investment Policy, in THE U.S.-IsRAEL
Fir t TRADE AREA AotE miEr § 26.07 (Andrew James Samet & Moshe Goldberg eds.,
1989) (indicating that 25% of Israel's budget is devoted to education and that cost per
hour of labor is significantly lower in Middle East than in United States).
13. AMERICAN EMBAssy EWADH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC
TRENDS AND THEm IMPLICAT1ONS FOR THE U.S.: SAUDI ARIuA 8 (1989). Saudi Arabia
holds one quarter of the world's known oil reserves and maintains one fifth of the
world's largest natural gas reserves. Id. As a result of these vast resources, many foreign
corporations seek commercial contracts with Saudi Arabia. Id.; David J. Karl, Islamic
Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 131, 131 (1992).
14. Lubetzky, supra note 6, at 413; see Bernard Avishai, Making the Desert Bloom, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A21 (indicating Israel has greater numbers of scientists and
engineers and higher average levels of education than Western nations).
15. Nancy B. Turck, Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia, 22 INT'L LAw. 415, 417
(1988). "[T]he non-Saudi businessman would not seek redress of commercial griev-
ances in the [Saudi Arabian] courts." Id.
As a matter of policy, it would appear thatjudgments issued by courts or arbi-
tral tribunals... will not be enforced in Saudi Arabia without a new hearing
before the appropriate Saudi court, subject to Saudi law. Consequently, any
such foreign judgment would only be enforced to the extent that it was consis-
tent with Saudi law.
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recognizes the need to eliminate this hesitation, thus increasing
investment and contracting within its borders. 6
In trying to assimilate into the Western"1 world, Saudi Ara-
bia and other Islamic countries are facing difficult questions re-
garding the abandonment of their cultural history. 8 Saudi Ara-
bia has traditionally been hostile to the recognition and enforce-
ment of non-domestic arbitral awards, finding these awards
contrary to Saudi Arabian law and public policy.' 9 During the
1950's, Saudi Arabian courts refused to enforce many non-Saudi
Arabian arbitral awards, finding them degrading and disrespect-
ful to Saudi Arabia's Islamic legal system. 20 In 1963, Saudi Ara-
bian governmental agencies were banned from using arbitration
as a means of resolving international commercial disputes.2' In
Id. at 435. Turck is not aware of the Saudi Arabian enforcement of any non-Saudi
Arabian judgments. Id.
16. Hoppe, supra note 5, at 192 (discussing Saudi Arabia's new international fo-
cus); Saudis Accept, supra note 2, at 26; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Saudi Arabia's move to assimilate into modem international arena).
17. See THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DicrroNAw 165 (2d ed. 1989). "Western" indicates
that which is "of or pertaining to the non-Communist states of Europe and America."
Id.
18. See David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law:
Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA.J. INT'L L. 819, 848 (1993).
For Muslim intellectuals confronting public international law, the devil's
choice is posed: either adopt the culture of the West, and lose one's cultures
and thus oneself, or renounce the culture of the West, and lose one's role in
the modern world. The Muslim is placed at a crossroads. To take one road is
to abandon the other.
Id.; see Saudis Accept, supra note 2, at 26 (stating that Saudi Arabia needs to ease its
historic stand toward arbitration to appease lobbying by law firms and business groups);
see also Hoppe, supra note 5, at 189-92 (indicating that Islamic Courts maintain residual
jurisdiction over international disputes).
19. Saudis Accept, supra note 2, at 26.
20. Id. Saudi Arabian hostility to arbitration awards culminated in the Ararnco
case (Saudi Arabia v. Aramco). ABDuL HAMM EL-AHmAB, ARBrRATON wrrH THE ARM
CouNTmRES 598-601 (1990). The arbitrators found that Saudi Arabian law applied to
the dispute, but held that Saudi Arabian law was insufficient. Id. Therefore, the arbi-
tration tribunal supplemented Saudi Arabian law with customary international law. Id.
The legal system [of Saudi Arabia] ... is still in embryo form ... ,even though
the totality of the principles... could be sufficient if one takes the initiative to
collect and unify them in order to lay down the basis of a petroleum law.
However, this is beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal which has a
judicial and not legislative role.
Id. at 601 (citing arbitral tribunal decision in Saudi Arabia v. Aramco). Soon thereafter,
the Saudi Arabian government began to limit legally the country's use of arbitration.
Id. at 602.
21. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58, Restricting Right of Saudi Governmental
Agency to Submit to Arbitration, dated 17/1/1383 [hereinafter Decree No. 58].
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addition, Saudi Arabia passed legislation in the 198322 that fur-
ther restricted its government's use of arbitration.2
Saudi Arabia's adoption of the New York Convention indi-
cates an easing of its historical resistance to international com-
mercial arbitration.24 Saudi Arabia reasons that by adopting the
New York Convention, non-Saudi Arabian investors may be more
confident that the courts of Saudi Arabia will honor a dispute
adjudicated by a non-Saudi Arabian tribunal.2 5 Article V(2) (b)
of the New York Convention, however, indicates that Saudi Ara-
bia is not required to recognize non-domestic arbitral awards
that are contrary to its public policy.26
This Note examines whether Saudi Arabia's adoption of the
New York Convention will advance the successful use of interna-
tional arbitration by non-Saudi Arabian investors. Part I pro-
vides a background of the New York Convention, its purpose,
and its historical application in the United States and the Middle
Eastern countries of Kuwait and Syria. Part II examines the con-
flict between the Saudi Arabian legal system and Saudi Arabia's
adoption of the New York Convention. Part III argues that Arti-
cle V(2) (b) of the New York Convention allows a country with a
Decree No. 58 of 1963 limits the ability of Saudi governmental organization,
e.g., ministries or agencies, to conclude any contract which includes a clause
subjecting such organizations to the jurisdiction of any foreign body having a
judicial character including arbiters. The Decree also states that this prohibi-
tion shall not apply to exceptional cases where the government (usually a Min-
ister) grants a concession. The decree of the Council of Ministers is of prime
importance for foreign businessmen as governmental organizations play the
major role in development projects of the Kingdom. As a result of this decree,
it is clear that companies entering into contracts with governmental bodies
cannot refer their disputes to international arbitration for settlement.
Berge Setrakian, Arbitration Under the Legal System of the Middle Eastern Countries, MIDDLE
E. EXEC. REP., Dec. 1978, at 10.
22. Arbitration Regulations, Royal Decree No. M/46, dated 12/7/1403 (April 25,
1983) [hereinafter Royal Decree No. M/46]. This regulation prohibits any Saudi Ara-
bian government agency from utilizing arbitration unless prior approval from the gov-
ernment has been procured. Id.
23. Royal Decree No. M/46, supra note 22; Neil F. Allam, Arbitration in the Kingdom:
The New Implementation of Rules, MIDDLE E. ExEc. REP., Aug. 1985, at 9 (indicating that
Saudi Arabia law prohibits all government agency arbitration unless prior approval is
received from President of Council of Ministers).
24. Saudis Accept, supra note 2. at 26.
25. See id. (stating that Saudi Arabian government hopes to gain confidence of
non-Saudi Arabian companies that have been concerned with having international arbi-
tration awards enforced in Saudi Arabia).
26. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
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unique legal system, such as Saudi Arabia, to give the appear-
ance of embracing the international community, while permit-
ting that country to reject arbitral awards that are contrary to its
public policy.27 Part III also recommends possible modifications
to Article V(2) (b) in order to prevent countries from refusing to
enforce non-domestic arbitral awards. This Note concludes that
the modification of Article V(2) (b) will prevent the circumven-
tion of the New York Convention's objectives and promote a uni-
form set of rules governing non-domestic arbitral awards.
I. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
The New York Convention requires signatories to enforce
the arbitral awards issued by other member nations.28 The Con-
vention contains a public policy defense, which allows a signa-
tory to refuse to enforce a non-domestic arbitral award if the
27. See id. (stating that New York Convention does not require country to enforce
foreign arbitral awards that are contrary to its public policy).
28. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The
Convention provides in relevant part:
[The] Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recogni-
tion and enforcement of such awards are sough.... Each Contracting State
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen.... Each Con-
tracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.
Id. Article V of the Convention sets forth the defenses pursuant to which a party can
challenge a foreign arbitral award. Id. art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.
Article V states that
[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refuses.. . only if...
[there is] proof that: (a) the parties... were.., under some incapacity... ; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings... ; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decision on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration... ; or (d) the composition
of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties... ; or (e) the award has not yet become binding
on the parties.... Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that (a) the subject matter of the difference is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) the
recognition or enforcement of the awards would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
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award is contrary to its public policy.29 Member nations rely on
the Convention to enforce international arbitral awards and,
therefore, in many instances subordinate their own rules of civil
procedure to the requirements of the Convention."0 Accord-
ingly, in an attempt to give the Convention its intended effect,
countries such as the United States, Kuwait, and Syria have given
the convention's public policy exception a narrow construc-
tion.31
A. History and Application of the New York Convention
A uniform international arbitration system requires the sys-
tematic and effective enforcement of international arbitral
awards.3 2 The ,New York Convention requires all signatories to
recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards.33 When the New
York Convention was initially promulgated, many countries were
hesitant to become signatories.3 4 This resistance arose from the
belief that the rules of the New York Convention were in conflict
with the countries' national laws.35 Article V(2) (b) of the New
York Convention, however, provides a vehicle whereby a signa-
29. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42. Article V(2) (b) states that "Erlecognition and enforcement of an arbi-
tral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recogni-
tion and enforcement is sought finds that... [t]he recognition or enforcement of the
awards would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Id.
30. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) (indicating that U.S. courts
subordinate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to rules of New York Convention); Code
of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art. 173(5) (Kuwait) (stating that Kuwaiti courts
have no jurisdiction over disputes subject to arbitration).
31. See Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that public policy defense in New York Convention must be read nar-
rowly); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C.
Cir.), cat. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (finding thatjudicial review of arbitration awards
is limited).
32. Strub, supra note 3, at 1031-32; see David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial
Judgment and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAw &
PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 325 (1987) (indicating that enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is
of critical importance in international business).
33. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40; Strub, supra note 3, at 1031.
34. See Strub, supra note 3, at 1038-39 (discussing Anglo-Saxon opposition to arbi-
tration processes and U.S. initial belief that New York Convention deviated from U.S.
law).
35. See HousE COMM. ON JuDIIAmY, FOREIGN ARwrrRAL AAwDs, H.RL REP. No.
1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970) (indicating United States resisted New York Con-
vention because Convention provisions deviated from U.S. law); Saudis Accept, supra
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tory can opt out of foreign arbitral award enforcement, if it finds
the award contrary to its public policy.36 This provision, to-
gether with increased recognition by international investors of a
true international commercial market,"7 has led many nations to
adopt the New York Convention, 8 and to embrace the Conven-
tion's international arbitral award enforcement policies.39
1. International Arbitration
Arbitration is a private dispute resolution method whereby
the parties to a dispute choose a disinterested party, or arbitra-
tor, to look at the facts of the dispute and render a decision.40
Several nations initially opposed the international arbitral pro-
cess because its rules and procedures deviated significantly from
the nations' law and rules.4 As the need to resolve commercial
disputes in the international arena increased,4" however, parties
found that submitting a dispute to international arbitration was
often preferable to appearing before a non-domestic court.43
note 2, at 26 (describing Saudi Arabia's belief that intemational arbitration was degrad-
ing to Saudi Arabian law and religion).
36. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
37. Carolyn B. Lamm, Recent Deveopments in International Arbitration, 36 FED. B.
NEws &J. 276, 276 (1989). There has been a "dramatic increase in international trade
and investment, and transactions involving parties of diverse nationality." IM
38. See International LegalFramework, supra note 1, at 36-37; Lamm, supra note 37, at
276 (indicating explosion of international arbitration in last 25 years).
39. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Interna-
tional Legal Framework, supra note 1, at 36-38 (listing accession dates for all New York
Convention signatories).
40. MAXWELL J. FULToN, CoMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 55
(1989).
41. See Strub, supra note 3, at 1039. The United States was so opposed to intema-
tional arbitration that when the New York Convention was adopted in 1958, the United
States did not sign. Id. "The American delegation believed that some of the Conven-
tion's provisions deviated from United States Law." Id.; see HousE COMM. ON THEJUDICI.
ARY, FOREIGN ARBrrRAL AwARDs, H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (indi-
cating that United States was opposed to New York Convention because it deviated
from U.S. law).
42. Lamm, supra note 37, at 276. "There has been a veritable explosion in interna-
tional arbitration in the last 25 years.... With the dramatic increase in international
trade and investment, and transactions involving parties of diverse nationality." Iii
43. IR; see Strub, supra note 3, at 1042 (stating that enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards is more uniform than enforcement of foreign judgments); see also Howard M.
Holtzman, Commentay, in INTERNAToNAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 60 YEARs OF ICC AR-
BErrATiON - A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 361, 362 (1984). Businessmen choose to include
arbitration clauses when negotiating international contracts. Id. Holtzman suggests
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In the international arena, investors prefer arbitration to lit-
igation because it offers a neutral forum wherein the parties are
not restricted by a potentially biased legal system.4 4 Further,
commercial investors often prefer international arbitration to
traditional litigation because arbitration can be faster and less
expensive than litigation.45 An additional advantage of interna-
tional arbitration is that the tribunal of arbitrators can maintain
jurisdiction over all necessary parties.46 Jurisdiction over all par-
ties is possible because in submitting to arbitration each party
has stipulated to the jurisdiction of the chosen arbitral tribu-
nals.47 This encompassing jurisdiction may not be possible
under the laws of a national court.48
Further benefits of arbitration include confidential and in-
formal proceedings.49 Proceedings that remain informal and
confidential often enable the parties to maintain working rela-
tionships with each other and with outside parties.50 A final ad-
that businessmen "are acting in the expectation that if there is an arbitration, there will
be an award and, if the award is not complied with voluntarily by the losing party, it will
be enforced under law by the courts of a country in which the losing party has assets."
Id.; seeJay Lawrence Westbrook, The ComingEncounter. InternationalArbitration and Bank-
ruptcy, 67 MmN. L. REv. 595, 595 (1983) [hereinafter Arbitration & Bankrupty] (finding
that parties prefer arbitration to litigation because international arbitration provides
assurance of neutrality).
44. Robert S. Matlin, Comment, T7e Federal Courts and the Enforc;ent of Foreign Arbi-
tralAwards, 5 PAcE L. REv. 151, 152-53 (1984); seeJan Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts
in Transnational CommercialArbitration, 21 VA.J. INt'L L 211, 212 (1981) (indicating that
chairman of arbitral tribunal will be of neutral nationality); Arbitration & Bankruptcy,
supra note 43, at 595 (finding that parties often prefer arbitration to litigation because
international arbitration provides assurance of neutrality, which is lacking in legal sys-
tems of most jurisdictions).
45. Lamm, supra note 37, at 276.
46. Id. Lamm indicates that arbitration would be especially important where one
party "could assert sovereign immunity against the judicial process of most countries."
Id.; seeJ. Sorton Jones, International Arbitration, 8 HASTIGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 213
(1985) (stating that parties agree to mode of arbitration before dispute arises, thus
waiving potential jurisdictional objections).
47. Lamm, supra note 37, at 276; seeJones, supra note 46, at 213 (indicating that
parties agree to arbitration and type of arbitration panel before dispute arises).
48. Lamm, supra note 37, at 276. For example, United States courts cannot main-
tain jurisdiction over nations that can assert sovereign immunity in the United States.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1604-07 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. Bmmy E. CATFa & Ptnup R. TwmBLE, INTERNATIoNAL LAw 337 (1991).
50. I&
[Arbitration] can be less formal and less contentious than court proceedings,
which is especially important if the parties want to maintain a continuing com-
mercial relationship.... The proceedings and decision can be kept confiden-
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vantage of arbitration is that arbitrators often have a personal
background or technical expertise in the area surrounding the
dispute.5 By comparison, judges and jurists trained in the law
often lack complete comprehension of the subject matter.52
2. U.N. Promulgation of the New York Convention
As the international community increased its use and reli-
ance on the international arbitration models,5 rules and proce-
dures were needed to ensure that a country could rely on an
arbitral award issued outside its jurisdiction.54 As an arbitral
award is not self-executing, 5  a method had to be developed to
effectuate the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.56 The
first international convention that addressed the issue of interna-
tional arbitral award enforcement was the 1927 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("Geneva Con-
vention"). 5 The Geneva Convention established enforcement
tial, which may be very useful when sensitive commercial information is in-
volved."
Id.
51. Jones, supra note 46, at 213. "[A]rbitrators often have technical expertise
which judges sometimes lack." Id.
52. Id.
53. Lamm, supra note 37, at 276 (indicating that use of international arbitration
has exploded in past twenty five years).
54. Strub, supra note 3, at 1042. "Uniformity is critical to the success of arbitra-
tion. Parties would not pursue arbitration if they were uncertain about their ability to
enforce an award. Conversely, if business persons are confident that their disputes can
be resolved effectively, international trade should advance smoothly." Id. Moreover, it
has been argued that the
[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards thus is not merely a legal exercise; it
is a commercial necessity. As we come increasingly to understand that world
peace is reinforced by harmonious international trade, we must equally recog-
nize that international commercial arbitration, and particularly an effective
climate for enforcing international arbitral awards, are fundamental elements
of stability.
Holtzman, supra note 43, at 362. "There is no more practical aspect of arbitration than
enforcement of international arbitration awards." Id.
55. Strub, supra note 3, at 1044. "But an arbitral award is not self-executing. Ab-
sent voluntary compliance, the authority of the arbitrator does not include the coercive
power to enforce the award, and thus the award must be transformed into ajudgment,
which can be executed with the enforcement mechanism of the state." Id. (citations
omitted).
56. Id. "Historically, effective enforcement has been the most significant barrier to
commercial arbitration." Id.; see generaly V.S. Deshpande, Enforcement of Foreign Awards
in India, UK and U.S.A., J. INT"L ARn., Mar. 1987, at 41, 43 (explaining foreign award
enforcement process in several countries).
57. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26,
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methods for all arbitral awards made pursuant to the Geneva
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 ("Geneva Protocol")."8
The Geneva Convention did not, however, provide a method for
enforcing arbitral awards made pursuant to legislation or treaties
other than the Geneva Protocol. 9
In 1958, representatives from several nations convened in
New York to increase the scope of the Geneva Convention,
thereby improving the rules and methods for enforcing all for-
eign arbitral awards. 0 The result was the promulgation of the
New York Convention. 61 The New York Convention requires the
reciprocal recognition of arbitral awards issued by member na-
tions.62 The New York Convention also sets forth the circum-
stances under which a member nation can refuse to enforce a
foreign arbitral award.6- Article V(2) (b) of the New York Con-
vention indicates that a member nation may refuse to enforce
anyforeign arbitral award that it finds contradictory to its public
policy. 64 Furthermore, the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award may be refused where: (1) the parties to the arbitration
agreement are, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity;" (2) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, 1930 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 28 (Cmd. 3655) [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
58. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 LN.T.S.
158, 1925 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 (Cmd. 2312) [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
59. Geneva Convention, supra note 57, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, 1930 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 28.
60. Strub, supra note 3, at 1045; ALBERTJAN VAN DEN BEG, THE NE w YoK ArBRaA.
TIoN CONVET ON OF 1958: TowARDS A UNIFORM JUDICL& INTERPREATION 8 (1981).
The Geneva Convention required that the winning party obtain permission to enforce
the award from the awarding country. Md at 7. This permission was required even
when the award was not questioned by the opposing party. Id. This provision required
the enforcing party to undertake several time and money consuming steps before
reaching the country where the party sought to enforce the award. 1d.
61. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
62. Id. art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40. The New York Convention is
often recognized as the most important international arbitration legislation. BERc,
supra note 60, at 1. "The New York Convention is 'the most important Convention in
the field of arbitration and... the cornerstone of current international commercial
arbitration.'" I; see supra note 28 (discussing purpose of New York Convention).
63. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40-42.
64. r& art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42. Article V(2) (b) states
that the "[r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that... [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Id.
65. 1M art. V(1) (a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
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law to which the parties have subjected it;66 (3) the party against
whom the award is invoked is not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceed-
ings;67 (4) the arbitral award deals with a difference not contem-
plated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration;68 or (5) the arbitration procedure is not in accord-
ance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place.69
3. U.S. Application of the New York Convention
The United States was initially opposed to the New York
Convention. 0 The United States did not sign the New York
Convention at its 1958 adoption, and, in fact, did not become a
signatory until September 30, 1970.7' The U.S. resistance to the
New York Convention arose from the U.S. belief that many of
the Convention's provisions were in conflict with U.S. law.72 The
United States, therefore, preferred to maintain its own in-
dependent jurisdiction over disputes submitted to arbitration."
Yet, as the use of the international arbitration process became a
generally accepted method of international dispute resolution,
the United States realized that it would need a method of dis-
pute resolution and enforcement that would permit it to resolve
66. Id.
67. Id art. V(l) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 830 U.N.T.S. at 42.
68. Id. art. V(1) (c), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
69. Id art. V(1) (d), 21 U.S.T. 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
70. Strub, supra note 3, at 1039.
71. AMmrcAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATON, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION K. A
COMPrLnATION OF BASIC AND FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DocumENTs 19-20 (4th ed. 1993).
Upon ratification the United States declared:
The United State of America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reci-
procity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the
territory of another Contracting State. The United States of America will ap-
ply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
national law of the United States.
Id. at 27.
72. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs, H.R. REP. No. 1181,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). "(T]he American delegation felt that certain provisions
were in conflict with our domestic laws." Id.; see Strub, supra note 3, at 1039 (stating
that United States believed Convention's provisions deviated from U.S. law).
73. Strub, supra note 3, at 1039; Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese Di As-
sicuranzioni E Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1983); Oriental Com-
mercial and Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Haardt v. Binzagr, No. CIV.A.H-83-5846, 1986 WL 14836, *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1986).
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international disputes efficiently and inexpensively.7 4
Since acceding to the New York Convention in 1970,7- the
United States has embraced international arbitration as an effec-
tive means of dispute resolution.7 6 The United States now relies
on the New York Convention as the recognized method for en-
forcing non-U.S. arbitral awards. 77 When making a determina-
tion on the validity of a non-U.S. arbitral award, U.S. courts
subordinate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the rules of
the New York Convention. 8 U.S. enforcement of the New York
Convention is evidenced by several U.S. court decisions that up-
hold the Convention's terms.79
a. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company8"
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the validity of interna-
tional arbitration agreements soon after the New York Conven-
tion was adopted by the United States.81 In Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co., 8 2 Scherk, a German citizen, transferred the rights to sev-
eral trademarks to Alberto-Culver, a U.S. company, pursuant to a
contract containing an arbitration clause.83 Alberto-Culver dis-
covered alleged encumbrances on the trademarks and tried to
rescind the contract.8 4 Scherk refused to rescind, and Albert-
Culver brought suit in the Federal District of Illinois.85 Scherk
brought a motion to stay the proceedings pending an arbitra-
tion, pursuant to the contract terms.86 The District Court de-
74. Matlin, supra note 44, at 157-59.
75. AMEmcAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 72, at 19.
76. Riwne, 712 F.2d at 54.
77. Matlin, supra note 44, at 151.
78. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969,975 (2d Cir. 1974). "By agreeing to submit disputes to arbitra-
tion, a party relinquished his courtroom ights... in favor of arbitration 'with all of its
well known advantages and drawbacks.' "Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 975 (quoting
Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 55 v. The Washington Post Co., 442
F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
79. Id.; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Oriental Commercial
and Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Haardt v.
Binzagr, No. CIV.A.H-83-5846, 1986 WL 14836, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1986).
80. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
81. Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.
82. Id. at 506.
85. Id. at 508.
84. Id. at 509.
85. Id.
86. Id. The contract provided "that 'any controversy or claim (that) shall arise out
1995]
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nied the motion to compel arbitration and the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.s7
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals, 88
held that an international agreement to arbitrate should be
respected and enforced by U.S. courts.8 9 The Court recognized
that any dispute involving more than one country will present
conflict-of-laws problems, and stated, therefore, that an advance
forum selection clause achieves both orderliness and predictabil-
ity.90 The Court continued, commenting that if the Court invali-
dated the arbitration provision, the United States would be re-
quiring all international disputes to be governed by U.S. law.9"
The Court further indicated that the U.S. Congress' recent
adoption of the New York Convention evidenced congressional
intent to enforce international arbitration agreements.9 2 The
Court, therefore, compelled arbitration.9 3
of this agreement or the breach thereof' would be referred to arbitration before the
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and that '(t)he laws of the State
of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern.'" I& at 508.
87. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 521.
89. Id. at 519-20.
90. Id. at 516.
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensa-
ble precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obvi-
ates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the prob-
lem area involved.
I& (stating that contract clause calling for arbitration is form of forum selection
clause).
91. 1& at 519.
The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us would not only
allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, re-
flect a 'parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.'
Id. (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971)).
92. Id. at 519 n.15.
93. Id. at 519-20. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. Id. at
527. The dissenters conceded that the New York Convention governed the matter but
would not compel arbitration based on Convention Article 11(3). Id. (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (finding that 1934 Act would invalidate arbitration provision and therefore
New York Convention would not compel arbitration); see New York Convention, supra
note 1, art. 11(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38, 40.
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b. Oriental Commercial and Shipping Company, Ltd. v. Rosseel,N V 94
In Rosseel,95 a dispute arose from an international oil
purchase agreement executed by Saudi Arabian and Belgian cor-
porations.98 The defendant, a Belgian corporation, moved to
compel arbitration under Article 11(3) of the New York Conven-
tion. 7 The Southern District of New York, in requiring the par-
ties to submit to arbitration, adopted a general policy favoring
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.98 The court indi-
cated that when a contract provision requiring the parties to ar-
bitrate is valid, the court is bound to enforce the agreement.99
The court held that because the parties were New York Conven-
tion signatories and had agreed to arbitrate their dispute pursu-
ant to the Convention, the parties were bound to the arbitration
results. 100 The court reasoned further that the New York Con-
vention provision that invalidates international arbitration agree-
94. Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
95. Rosseel, 609 F. Supp. at 77.
96. Id. at 77.
97. Id. (moving in District Court for Southern District of New York); see New York
Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38-40. Article H(3)
provides:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbi-
tration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.
Id.
98. Rossed, 609 F. Supp. at 77.
99. Id. at 78. The Southern District of New York reiterated its contention that
contract provisions requiring arbitration should be upheld in Oilex A.G., v. Mitsui &
Co., 669 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Oiex, the plaintiff, a Swiss company, brought
suit for the alleged breach of a Columbian diesel fuel contract. Oilex, 669 F. Supp. at
86. The defendant counterclaimed pursuant to plaintiff's alleged breach of a Saudi
Arabian gasoline contract. Id. The plaintiff moved to stay the counterclaims, contend-
ing that the Saudi Arabian contract was subject to resolution via arbitration. Id. The
court found that the contract was subject to arbitration and that the court was bound to
honor this provision. Id. at 87. The court further held, however, that because the con-
tract was unclear as to where and pursuant to what law the arbitration was to be held it
was unable to compel arbitration. Id. at 87-88.
100. Rosseel, 609 F. Supp. at 77-78 (holding that arbitration agreement is void only
when internationally recognized defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud or waiver are
present) (citing Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir.
1983)).
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ments' 01 should be narrowly construed to void agreements only
when faced with a contract defense such as fraud or duress.10 2
c. Haardt v. Binzagr03
In Haardt v. Binzagr, the Southern District of Texas en-
forced a non-U.S. arbitral award.10 4 In Haardt, the plaintiff
brought suit to recover damages for the alleged breach of a part-
nership agreement. 10 5 The defendant petitioned the court to
compel arbitration in a non-U.S.jurisdiction, indicating that the
written agreements between the parties stated that disputes
would be resolved by arbitration in London. 06 Based on provi-
sions of the New York Convention, the court granted defend-
ant's motion, and compelled non-U.S. arbitration. 0 7 The court
found that the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate pursuant to the
New York Convention, relinquished all of their rights under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 08 The Haardt court upheld
the validity of the New York Convention, finding that once the
parties had agreed to arbitrate, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were no longer applicable. 0 9
B. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention: The Public Policy
Defense
The signatories to the New York Convention have agreed to
101. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40, 42.
102. Rosseel, 609 F. Supp. at 77-78.
103. Haardt v. Binzagr, No. CIV.A.H-83-5846, 1986 WL 14836, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 1986).
104. Haardt, 1986 WL 14836, at *3. Plaintiff sought to vacate an international arbi-
tration award asserting defenses pursuant to New York Convention Article V(1) (c) and
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The court found that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable and that the plaintiff had no valid Article V
defense. Id. The court, therefore, ordered enforcement of the arbitral award. Id.
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3. "By agreeing to submit to arbitration, Plaintiff signs away his rights
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in favor of arbitration." Id. (citing Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d
969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974)). See generaUy Fed. R. Civ. P. (setting forth rules of procedure
that are to be followed in U.S. courts).
109. Haardt, 1986 WL 14836 at *1.
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enforce the arbitral awards issued by other member nations. 10
Insofar as a non-domestic award differs significantly from the
country's public policy, however, Article V(2) (b) of the New
York Convention provides a vehicle whereby the member nation
is not required to enforce the award."' Consequently, the pub-
lic policy exception of Article V(2) (b) of the New York Conven-
tion has been construed narrowly by many signatory nations in
an attempt to give the New York Convention greater effect.112
1. Middle Eastern Nations
Each Middle Eastern Nation, in considering the adoption of
international arbitral legislation, faces its own set of issues and
problems." 3 Many Middle Eastern countries, including Yemen,
Oman, and Qatar, have not acceded to an international arbitra-
tion convention," 4 finding the terms of these conventions con-
trary to their internal legal systems." 5 Those Middle Eastern
110. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 111, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40. Article III of the New York Convention states that
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and en-
force them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where
the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following
articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or
higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to
which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or en-
forcement of domestic arbitral awards.
rd.
111. Id. art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
112. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974); see Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian
Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (indicating that public policy de-
fense remains in Convention, but courts should give exception narrow reading to up-
hold general purpose of Convention, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards).
113. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 20 (discussing each Middle Eastern nation's role in
international arbitration).
114. Id. at 525, 551, 574; International Legal Framework, supra note 1, at 36-38 (list-
ing New York Convention Signatory nations).
[A]t one end of the spectrum are countries which have enacted laws on the
topic, and at the other end are those which have not so far done so. Bahrain
and Kuwait belong to the former category, whereas Oman and Qatar belong
to the latter. Somewhere in between is the position of Saudi Arabia.
Husain M. Al-Bahama, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the GCC
Countries with Particular Reference to Bahrain, 4 ARAB LAw Q. 332, 337 (1989).
115. EL-AtmAB, supra note 20, at 525, 551, 574. In the field of arbitration there is a
lack of uniformity among the Arab countries. SA~mr SAL.EH, THE RECOGNmON AND EN.
FORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBrniAL AwARus IN mE STATES OF THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 19
(1985-86).
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countries that have acceded to the New York Convention, such
as Kuwait and Syria, were not traditionally hostile to interna-
tional arbitration. 118
a. Kuwait
Kuwait acceded to the New York Convention in 1978.117
This accession, however, did not pose a conflict for Kuwait be-
cause Kuwait's general rule of civil procedure" 8 was to recognize
international arbitration agreements 19 and to subordinate the
Kuwaiti legal system to the rules of the arbitration tribunal. 120
Kuwait acceded to the New York Convention primarily to im-
prove Kuwaiti relations with other signatory countries.1 21 Kuwait
did not accede to the New York Convention to give the interna-
tional community increased confidence in its enforcement of
non-domestic arbitral awards. 122 In fact, Kuwaiti enforcement of
international arbitration awards was routine prior to its adoption
of the New York Convention. 23
Arbitration is one of the most valued methods of dispute
resolution in Kuwait.'2 4 Kuwaiti law encourages arbitration and
provides that an arbitral award cannot be appealed after it has
116. EL-AHDAB, supra note 20, at 363; see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text
(discussing Saudi Arabia's intermediate position in Middle Eastern recognition of inter-
national arbitral awards).
117. EL-AmDA, supra note 20, at 384.
118. Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art. 173(5) (Kuwait).
119. rd. "Courts shall not be concerned with the consideration of the disputes
where Arbitration is agreed thereto." Id.; see EL-AHDAB, supra note 20, at 384. "Para-
graph 5 of Article 173 categorically states that the courts have no jurisdiction over dis-
putes subject to an agreement to arbitrate." Id.
120. Id.
It should... be understood that, as far as foreign arbitral awards are con-
cemed, the position in... Kuwait is that the legal conditions contained in the
New York Convention, rather than those laid down in the... laws on Civil and
Commercial Procedures, will apply to the awards originating from the States
parties to the New York Convention. It cannot be disputed that the New York
Convention as a treaty will prevail over inconsistent domestic laws.
Al-Bahama, supra note 114, at 338.
121. EL-AHDAB, supra note 20, at 384.
122. Id.
123. Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art. 173(5) (Kuwait); Al-Bahama,
supra note 114, at 338.
124. Isa A. Huneidi, Arbitration Under Kuwaiti Law, 4 ARAB LAW Q. 20, 20 (1989).
"Kuwaiti law regards arbitration as an exceptional method of litigation." Id.; see supra
notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of arbitration).
1995] SAUDI ARABIA AND ARBITRATION
been rendered.'2 5 Moreover, the Kuwaiti grounds for vacating a
domestic arbitral award are narrow.12 6  In fact, the Kuwaiti
grounds are more narrow than the grounds prescribed by the
New York Convention.1 27
In 1984, for example, Kuwait was called upon to enforce an
arbitral award made in England. 2 ' In Merrill Lynch v.
Behbehani,129  a US$1,314,484.96 award was issued against
Behbehani by an English arbitrator.130 On an action for en-
forcement in Kuwait, the court ruled to enforce the award,'
evidencing Kuwait's willingness to enforce non-Kuwaiti arbitral
awards.'3 2
b. Syria
Syria acceded to the New York Convention in 1959.'-1
Although Syria's legal system is based on the ancient laws of Is-
lam,'14 Syria has had significant contact with Western cultures,'35
125. Huneidi, supra note 124, at 21. "One of the most important provisions of the
law is that an award is final and unappealable unless the parties agree otherwise before
the issue of the award." Id.
126. It The Kuwaiti grounds for arbitral award annulment are:
(1) The absence or invalidity or time lapse of the arbitration agreement, or if
the award went beyond the terms of the agreement; (2) The presence of a
defect such as would provide ground for review and reconsideration of a court
judgment; (or] (3) The presence of a basic defect in the proceedings or in the
award as would justify an application for annulment of a court judgment.
Id.; see New York Convention, supra note 1, art V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40,
42; supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (stating New York Convention grounds
for non-enforcement of arbitral awards).
127. Huneidi, supra note 124 at 20; New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V, 21
U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40-42.
128. Merrill Lynch v. Behbehani (1985); see Al-Bahama, supra note 114 at 340.
129. Merrill Lynch, supra note 128.
130. Al-Bahama, supra note 114, at 340.
131. Id. Enforcement actions were also brought in Bahrain to attach Behbehani's
assets in that jurisdiction. Merrill Lynch v. Behbehani, Case No. 859/M/1985 before
the Civil High Court of Appeal (Bahrain). Bahrain, after appeal, also ordered the en-
forcement of the English arbitration award. Al-Baharna, supra note 114, at 340-41.
132. Al-Baharna, supra note 114, at 343. "[Oin the basis of the decision of...
Merrill Lynch'v. Abduljalil Behbehani, it can be said that courts of Kuwait... would
enforce a foreign judgment or award issued in England." IR As a general rule,
"[fjoreignjudgments and awards are enforced in... Kuwait when the law of the coun-
try of the origin of the judgment or award would enforce the judgments and awards
passed in .. . Kuwait on the basis of reciprocity." I& at 342-43. This reciprocity is
required by all signatories to the New York Convention. New York Convention, supra
note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
133. Intranational Legal Framework, supra note 1, at 38.
134. SAYm HAss AMrN, MmIDLE EAST LEGAL SysTmms 355 (1985) (hereinafter
938 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONALLAWJOURUAL [Vol. 18:920
and therefore its laws reflect many Western international
views.13 6 Syria's traditional public international policy encour-
ages the enforcement of non-Syrian arbitral awards.""7 Syria
does not require reciprocity in its enforcement of non-Syrian ar-
bitral awards.'3 8 Syria, therefore, enforces all non-Syrian arbitral
awards, whether or not the award was made by a New York Con-
vention signatory.'8 9 The New York Convention prevails over
traditional Syrian law in all cases of non-Syrian arbitral award en-
forcement.1 40
Although Syria has a traditional policy that enforces non-
Syrian arbitral awards, the obstacles that must be overcome to
achieve this enforcement are often onerous.' The enforcing
court may require an accurate translation of the contract provi-
sions that relate to the arbitration agreement. 142 The court may
further require a written verification of the award from the arbi-
tral tribunal or translated copies of the arbitration proceed-
ings. 143 These documents may significantly increase the time
LEGAL SySmMS] (stating that Islamic jurisprudence is main source of law in Syria).
Arabs took control of Syria in 635 A.D., establishing Syria's first Muslin dynasty and the
Islamic basis of Syrian law. Id.
135. Id. at 356. "Syria became part of the Ottoman Empire between 1453 and
1918. Accordingly, the legal history of Syria during this period, in spite of the Syrian
Crisis which brought this country under Egyptian rules (1832-33), is closely linked with
the general political and legal culture of the Ottomans." I&; see ITzKowrrz NoRMAN,
OTrrom, EMPIRE AmD IsLAmc TRADTMON (1972) (discussing Ottoman law). The
French took control of Syria in 1916; Syria regained its independence in 1943. LEGAL
SYSTEMS, supra note 134, at 358-59.
136. LEGAL Svsris, supra note 134, at 357. As part of their legal reform in Syria,
the Ottoman's imported the European codes of law. Id.
137. Id.; Jacques EI-Haklim, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in
Syria, 5 AaB LAw Q. 137 (1990).
138. EI-Hakim, supra note 137, at 139. "No reservation was made by Syria requir-
ing reciprocity in the enforcement of the Convention." Id.
139. Id.
140. I " [T]he provisions of the New York Convention prevail [in Syria] over the
provisions of the [Syrian] Procedure Code." Id.
141. Id. at 141-42.
142. Id. at 141.
143. Id.
In case of an arbitration clause, this may require the translation of the whole
contract containing that clause, which represents considerable work. If the
defendant contends that a condition of enforcement is not fulfilled, he must
bring evidence thereon. This may require the production of a certificate from
the arbitral body which organised the arbitration or a copy of the arbitration
records or the hearing of witnesses.
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and cost involved in enforcing a non-Syrian arbitral award.1 "
2. The United States
The United States was historically resistant to international
arbitration." The U.S. adoption of the New York Convention,
therefore, created many of the same public policy and tradi-
tional law conflicts that were recently created when Saudi Arabia
acceded to the Convention.1 46 The U.S. courts initially looked
to U.S. legislative history in hopes of resolving this conflict, but
the legislative history was generally silent. 47 Subsequently, the
courts reconciled the conflict by holding that the U.S. public
policy interest in a uniform international policy outweighed the
U.S. public policy interest in requiring that all arbitral awards be
consistent with: U.S. law.148
! In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier,49 Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du
Papier ("RAKTA") sought U.S. confirmation of a non-U.S. arbi-
tral award that found Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inv.
("Overseas") liable to RAKTA for breach of contract.150 In 1963,
Overseas and RAKTA entered an agreement to build and man-
age a paperboard mill in Egypt.' In 1967, however, on the eve
of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War,- 2 the majority of Overseas'
144. Id.
145. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974). "The United
States Arbitration Act. . . revers[ed] centuries ofjudicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments .... " Id. at 510. The United States Arbitration Act is the U.S. codification of the
NewYork Convention. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ofJune 10, 1958, shall
be enforced in U.S. Courts .... " 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra notes
70-74 and accompanying text (discussing United States initial resistance to interna-
tional arbitration).
146. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
du Papier, 508 F.2d 969,973 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
147. Parsons & Whitleore, 508 F.2d at 973. "The legislative history of the provision
offers no certain guidelines to its construction." Id.
148. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd, 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975); Parsons
Whitemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
149. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 969.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 972.
152. See MmRY GovxmtmE IN THz TrTrroPms ADmnasreaE ly ISRAEL 1967-
1980: THE LEcAL AsPECtS 13 (Meir Shamgar, ed. 1982). The Six Days War in 1967 was
the period when "the Gaza Strip, SinaiJudia and Samaria and the Golan actually came
under the control and authority of the Israeli Defense Forces." Id.
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workers fled from Egypt, leaving the contract incomplete.153
RAKTA sought damages for breach, and Overseas invoked the
contract's arbitration clause.' The arbitrators found Overseas
liable to RAKTA for breach of contract.' 55 Overseas challenged
the enforcement of the non-U.S. arbitral award, contending that
the award was contrary to U.S. public policy.'5"
The Second Circuit confirmed the arbitral award. 5" The
court held that a non-U.S. arbitral award may only be denied
enforcement on the basis of Article V(2) (b) of the New York
Convention'58 when the award would violate the most funda-
mental notions of morality and justice.'5 9 The court further
held that the history of the New York Convention favored arbi-
tral award enforcement 60 and, therefore, the United States
should give a narrow reading to all Convention defenses.''
The roots of the Six Days War go back to the deep-seated hostility of the Arab
States towards Israel and their declared intent and purpose to end its exist-
ence. The War of 1967, the third between Israel and its neighbors, was one
link in the chain of belligerent acts which were designed at first to prevent the
reestablishment ofJewish independence ....
I at 16. See generaUy SYvrqEY D. BAmw, THE MAXING OF RESOLUTIoN 242 (1985) (pro-
viding comprehensive discussion of Arab-Israeli Six Days War and its resolution).




157. Id. at 969.
158. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42. Article V(2) (b) states that the "[r]ecognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that... the recognition or erf'orcement of
the awards would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Id.
159. Parsons &s' Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974. The Court concluded that the
"[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis [the Conven-
tion's public policy defense] only where enforcement would violate the forum state's
most basic notions of morality and justice." Id.; see I REsTATEMrNr (SECOND) OF THE
CoNFucr OF LAws § 117 cmt. c, at 340 (1969) (discussing enforcement of foreign na-
tion judgments).
Judgments rendered in foreign nations are not entitled to the protection of
full faith and credit. A State of the United States is therefore free to refuse
enforcement to such a judgment on the ground that the original claim on
which the judgment is based is contrary to its public policy.... [E]nforcment
will usually be accorded the judgment except in situations where the original
claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the
State where enforcement is sought.
Id.
160. Parsons &" Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
161. Id.
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The Southern District of New York followed this narrow
reading of Article V(2) (b) in Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian
Chens. Corp.112 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. sought U.S. confirmation of
a non-U.S. arbitral award rendered against Calabrian Chemicals
Corporation pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by
the New York Convention. 163 Calabrian Chemicals Corporation
sought to vacate the arbitration award based on Article V(2) (b)
of the New York Convention.'6 The court, in confirming the
arbitral award, concluded that although the public policy de-
fense in Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention remains,
the defense must be read narrowly to be effective only when in-
ternational arbitral award enforcement would violate the most
fundamental notions of justice.165
II. THE SAUDI ARABIAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS
APPROACH TO ARBITRATION
Saudi Arabia has a long-standing history of rejecting non-
domestic methods of dispute resolution.1 66  It also has current
policies that restrict, if not prohibit, various types of interna-
To read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of national
political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility. This
provisions was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics
under the rubric of 'public policy.' Rather, a circumscribed public policy doc-
trine was contemplated by the Convention's framers and every indication is
that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, meant to subscribe to
this supranational emphasis.
Id. at 974 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
162. Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
163. Brandeis, 656 F. Supp. at 161.
164. Id. at 163; NewYork Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520,
330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
165. Brandeis, 656 F. Supp. at 163-65; Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Pri-
vate Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980). "[Tlhe
federal courts have recognized a strong federal policy in favor of voluntary commercial
arbitration.... As a result, judicial review of an arbitration award has been narrowly
limited." Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
166. Paul E. Pompeo, East Meets West: A Comparison of Government Contract Dispute
Resolution in the Common Law and Islamic Systems, 14 Loy. L A, INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 815,
840-41 (1992); Royal Decree No. M/46, supra note 22 (indicating that government de-
pendents cannot use arbitration without Council of Ministers' approval); Mmsyra OF
COMMERCE, MEMORANDUM ON ARBITRATION CLAUsEs No. 3/3/1756, dated 24/5/1399
(requesting public decree establishing that arbitration clauses providing for non-do-
mestic resolution are void) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM ON ARBrrRATnON].
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tional commercial arbitration.167 Saudi Arabia has chosen, how-
ever, to adopt the NewYork Convention, whose primary purpose
is to promote the acceptance and enforcement of non-domestic
arbitral awards.6'c
A. Sources of Saudi Arabian Law
The Saudi Arabian legal system is based on the religion of
Islam.16 9 Islam provides a framework for law and government, in
addition to a religion, for the people of Saudi Arabia.170 The
Saudi Arabian legal system focuses on the enforcement of Is-
lamic culture and values.17 1 This focus is contrary to contempo-
rary Western law, which generally emphasizes economics.172
Islamic law is taken primarily from two sources: the
Qur'an,17 3 and the Sunna. 74 In the law of Islam, the Qur'an is
167. Pompeo, supra note 166, at 840-41; Royal Decree No. M/46, supra note 24;
MEMORANDUM ON ARBITRATION, supra note 166.
168. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
169. Karl, supra note 13, at 132-33;Joseph L. Brand, Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law &
Practice, 9 B.C. INT'L & Conp. L. REv. 1, 2 (1986).
170. BASSAM Tint, ISLAM AND THE CU.URA ACCOmmODATION OF SocA. CHANGE 57
(Clare Krojzl trans., 1990). "As an organic religious system Islam embraces all spheres
of life and has strict commandments for conduct within them. Islamic law ... claim (s]
to define and structure all aspects of human behavior." Id. (citations omitted). "Islam
is an entire way of life: a religion, an ethic, a lifestyle, and a legal system .... " Karl,
supra note 13, at 134.
171. C.G. WEERAMANTmy, ISLAMIc JRISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrVE
31 (1988). "[T]he values of Islamic culture are not as focused on contemporary human
needs as they are on ensuring that people live according to God's will." Karl, supra note
13, at 136-37.
172. W rzR N , supra note 171, at 31; see PATRIc*K BANNERAN, ISLAM IN PEa-
spEarcv: A GUIDE TO IsLAmic Sociamy, PoLmcs AND LAw 31-33 (1988) (indicating that
Western law focusses on societal needs while Islamic law focusses on God's needs).
173. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 895-97. The Qur'an is the holy book of Islam.
Id, It is the record of God's revelations to Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam. Id.
174. SAYED HASSAN AMID, IsLAMIC LAw IN ma CoNTEMPoRARY Wom 8-9 (1985)
[hereinafter ComEmpoRAit' WORLD]. "Islamic Law, as communicated by God through
his Prophet, Mohammed, was not a mere collection of metaphysical abstractions, but
was transmitted in a context embodying a philosophy for organizing an entire society
with a divine purpose." Karl, supra note 13, at 134 n.14 (citations omitted).
[The Sunna are the] tradition of examples set by the Prophet, and deriva-
tively, by his closest companions. As the Islamic world extended in time and
space, the transmission of the tradition shifted from the direct assimilation of
example, to the recounting of stories about the Prophet and those near to
him, and ultimately, to the construction of a body of authenticated texts.
Although not revealed, Sunna is a divinely sanctioned source of law... In the
classical scheme, Sunna was the second most authoritative source of law.
Westbrook, supra note 18, at 896.
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the word of GOd ("Allah"). 175 The Qur'an is the written basis for
all Islamic law,176 and provides the absolute authority on Islamic
life.177 The Qur'an contains approximately 6000 verses 178 and
guides the Muslim in every aspect of his daily life, including the
law.17 9 The Qur'an is Islam's absolute legal authority.8 0 Schol-
ars and jurists may only look to other legal sources if the Qur'an
is silent on a topic.'
The Sunna, which translates as the "beaten path"18 2 or the
prevailing customary law,'83 are a set of rules deduced from the
stories, texts, and conduct of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed.1 8 4
175. 5A MODERN LEcG.L SwSrEms [qPEDA 100.5 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990).
Allah is the Islamic word for God. I&S The word of Allah is spoken through Moham-
med, the Prophet and founder of Islam. Karl, supra note 13, at 138 n.37. "Every word
of the Qur'an is regarded as the utterance of the Almighty communicated in His actual
words by the angel Gabriel, the Holy Spirit, to the Prophet [Mohammed]." S.G. Vesey-
Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources ofthe Shari'a, in OiuiN AND DEvELOPMENT OF IsLAwc LAw
85 (Majid Khadduri & HerbertJ. Liebesny eds., 1955).
176. WEERAMANrRY, supra note 171, at 32.
177. Id. at 33.
178. Karl, supra note 13, at 138.
179. CoNTEMORAy WoRim, supra note 174, at 10. Less than eighty verses of the
aforementioned 6000 would be deemed legal by a western lawyer. Karl, supra note 13,
at 138; S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, supra note 175, at 85. Islam, however, reads the Qur'an as
a whole, and therefore the remaining 5920 versus also guide Islamic legal interpreta-
tion. Karl, supra note 13, at 138. Examples of Qur'anic versus that deal with interna-
tional commercial law include:
On Commercial integrity- "And draw not near to the property of the orphan
except in a godly way till he attains his maturity and fulfills the promise; surely
(every) promise shall be questioned about." The Qur'an, 17:34... On trea-
ties: "Except those of the idolaters with whom you made an agreement, then
they have not failed you in anything and have not backed up any one against
you, so fulfill their agreement to the end of their term; surely Allah loves those
who are careful (of their duty). The Qur'an, 9:4.
Id.
180. Karl, supra note 13, at 138.
181. Id. Islamic legal sources, other than the Qur'an include: Sunna, lima', Qiyas,
and royal decrees. Id. at 38-44. The followers Islam are divided into two groups: Sun-
nis and Shi'ites. Id. at 47. "The Sunnis seek their inspiration down the centuries in the
Qur'an... The Shi'ites believe that the indispensable media for understanding the
truth proclaimed by the Prophet are the Imam [heads of State]." Id. at 48. The major-
ity of Muslims, along with Saudi Arabia nation conforms to the Sunnis legal and reli-
gious framework. I&
182. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 896; see supra note 174 and accompanying text
(defining Sunna as customary law).
183. CoNr MroRAR WoRLD, supra note 174, at 9.
184. WEE 4mA1n, supra note 171, at 34. According to Islamic history, Allah, or
God, chose Mohammed as his messenger. Id. at 34-35. Allah delivered his Divine Reve-
lations to the people through the voice of Mohammed. 5A MODERN LEcAL SymSEMs
CvcLo EniA 100.5 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990). In 610 A.D., Mohammed estab-
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The Sunna are a major source of Islamic law, second only to the
Qur'an.'8 5 The Sunna provide Islamic jurists with customary
law'1 6 on subjects that the Qur'an does not directly address.1 17
Two other sources of Islamic law are the ijma' 18 8 and the
Qiyas. 18 9 The ijma' is the third source of Islamic law.'90 It pro-
vides answers to questions that arise from changing societal con-
ditions.' 9 ' The ijma' is developed by the unanimous consensus
of specific recognized Islamic legal scholars.192 The scholars
modify the accepted interpretations of the Qur'an and the
Sunna to coincide with modem language, and custom. 19
lished a "social order based on Divine Revelation" to correct society's wrongdoings. Id.
These wrongdoings included: exploiting the poor, malpractice and fraud in trade, and
general irresponsibility. Id. Mohammed spent ten years at Mecca and then moved to
Medina, where he spent thirteen years describing his revelations to young Muslim fol-
lowers. Id.
"The traditions [Sunna] ... were reduced to writing, compiled and used as a most
important authority in Islamic law ranking after the Qur'an. They can be linked to
'case law' in the Anglo-American legal systems." CoNrnMPORARY WoRLD, supra note
174, at 10. The term "hadith" is often used interchangeably with the term "Sunna." Id.
In actuality, "hadith" refers to a story or tradition, while the term "Sunna" refers to the
rule of law which has been deduced from this story. WEERAmANTRY, supra note 171, at
34-35.
185. WEERmANTwrR, supra note 171, at 34.
186. Com, MoRARY WoRD, supra note 174, at 9-10. Customary law is based on
traditional or customary resolution of an issue. I& It is a guide informing Islamicju-
rists as to prior actions by those similarly situated. Id.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Karl, supra note 13, at 139. Ijma' is adjudication under consensus and una-
nimity. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 895. "Technically, [ljma' is] the unanimous agree-
ment of all qualified legal scholars of an age upon a legal rule. The third source of law
in the classical [Islamic] scheme." Id.
189. Karl, supra note 13, at 140. Qiyas is the analogy used in legal reasoning.
Westbrook, supra note 18, at 895; see CONTEMPoRARY WoRLD, supra note 174, at 11 (dis-
cussing use ofjuristic analogy or qiyas).
190. CoJTEmPoRARY WoRL, supra note 174, at 10-11; Westbrook, supra note 18, at
895.
191. CoNTmpoZamy WoRi., supra note 174, at 10.
As Islam spread rapidly and was accepted widely the changing conditions of
the muslim societies brought about ... complicated problems for which
neither the Qur'an nor the Prophetic Traditions [Sunna] had provided a rem-
edy ... As such recourse was made to 'consensus' or... ijma which was
accepted as a further source of law.
IdS
192. Id. at 10-11. The translation of ima' means "adjudication under consensus,
unanimity. Technically, the unanimous agreement of all qualified legal scholars of an
age upon a legal rule. The third source of law in the classical scheme." Westbrook,
supra note 18, at 895.
193. Karl, supra note 13, at 139-40.
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Qiyas, a method of legal reasoning by analogy, provides last
resort answers to legal problems on which the Qur'an, Sunna,
and ijma' are silent.194 Qiyas allow Saudi Arabian jurists to extra-
polate from the Qur'an or Sunna by way of legal reasoning and
analogy.'95 Saudi Arabian jurists are able to analogize from mat-
ters specified in the Qur'an and the Sunna to topics not specifi-
cally addressed in these texts.'96
B. Interpretation of Saudi Arabian Law
There are four different methods that Muslims may utilize
in interpreting the sources of Islamic law: 97 Hanifa,9 s Maliki,199
Shafi'i, 20 0 and Hanbali. 20 1 Hanbali, the strictest of Islamic inter-
194. Id. at 140.
A Muslim judge, therefore, has to search first in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and
'consensus of opinion' [ijma'] to find out rules applicable to the case before
him. If there is no appropriate legal authority or the texts are not clear
enough the Islamic judge is authorized to apply an accepted principle or an
assumption that to his wisdom and knowledge might fit the problem best.
CoNTEMPoRARY WORLD, supra note 174, at 11.
195. Karl, supra note 13, at 139-40.
196. Id. at 142 n.72.
197. WE , mANTRY, supra note 171, at 49-54. There are four school if Sunni Islam.
Id. at 49. "Each of these schools had settled geographical areas of dominance, and
cumulatively, the Sunni school commanded the allegiance of the majority of the Islamic
World." I& at 49; see supra note 181 (discussing Sunni Islam).
198. Id. at 49-51.
The Hanafi school ofjurisprudence empabsised the importance of the public
interest in a consideration of legal question. It is the school largely prevalent
in Central Asia, Turkey, Afghanistan and Indian sub-continent. In Egypt, Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon, its presence is very strong, while in the Soviet Union and
China the majority of Muslims are of this school.
Id. at 50-51. The Hanafi school believes arbitration is legal because "it accords to the
needs of social life in that it is less complex than resorting to courts." EL-AHDAB, supra
note 20, at 20; see S.H. AmmN, IsLA, uc LAw AND Its IMPUCTION FOR MODERN WORLD
(1989) [hereinafter MODERN WoRLD] (discussing Hanifa school of Islamic interpreta-
tion).
199. WEERAmANY, supra note 171, at 51-52. The Maliki school relies heavily on
the traditions of the Prophet. Id. at 51. Modem Maliki is an "extremely scientific
method of inquiry." I. Maliki is utilized in West Africa, Islamic Spain, Tunis, Algeria,
Morocco, Nigeria, and upper Egypt. Id. at 51; see MODEN WORD, supra note 198 (dis-
cussing Maliki school of Islamic interpretation); YusHAu SODI, MAUIWS CONCOrr OF
MASLAHAH (1991) (applying Maliki school of Islamic Interpretation).
200. WERAmANmy, sup-a note 171, at 52-53. "The Shafi'ite school was particularly
strong in logic and reason." Id. The Shafi'i school accepts the doctrine of qiyas and has
developed a set of rules with which this doctrine could operate. Id. Adherents to
Shafi'i are found mostly in East Africa, Bahrain, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Id.
at 51; see MODERN WORLD, supra note 198 (discussing Shafi'i school of Islamic interpre-
tation); supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of qiyas).
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pretations, has traditionally rejected independent thinking ("ij-
tihad").202 The Hanbali school of Islamic law, therefore, has re-
sisted the modem trend of Western law, which relies on jurist
interpretation of historical documents.203 In the early twentieth
century, Saudi Arabia accepted Hanbali as its official method of
interpreting Islamic law.204 Saudi Arabian civil law courts are re-
quired to utilize Hanbali legal texts, including Hanbali interpre-
tations of the Qur'an and the Sunna.20 5
Although Saudi Arabia's adoption of the Hanbali school of
law has restricted its use of legal interpretation and independent
thought, Saudi Arabia is not bound solely by the Islamic rules
and regulations created in 610 A.D.2 11 The King of Saudi Ara-
bia,20 7 pursuant to royal decree, has the ability to promulgate
administrative regulations on topics of public welfare. 208 New
regulations are permitted on topics of public welfare because it
is an area of the law where the Qur'an and the Sunna are si-
lent.20 9 On topics addressed in the Qur'an and Sunna, however,
the King, like all Saudi Arabian citizens, is required to follow the
Qur'an's and Sunna's established rules, regulations, and laws.210
C. Saudi Arabian Commercial Contracting
Several Saudi Arabian commercial contracting principles
201. WE RAmAN'R, supra note 171, at 54; see MODERN WORLD, supra note 198 (dis-
cussing Hanbali school of Islamic interpretation).
202. 5A MODEN SwrEMs CvcLoiPrIA 100.10 (Kenneth R. Redden 1990) (defining
ijtihad as original thought). "(S]ince the tenth century, Muslim scholars announced
that the door of ljtihad (original thinking) had been closed." Id. "The intellectual
question which continues to present itself is whether Ijtihad alone would bring Muslim
societies into the contemporary times." Id.
203. HERBERTJ. LEEBESNy, FoREIGN LEGAL. Svsrms: A COMPARATrvE AALVsis 238-
39 (4th ed. 1981).
204. Karl, supra note 13, at 141;Jeanne Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia:
The Contemporay Application of Islamic Law, 16 INT'L LAw. 321, 323 n.12 (1982).
205. Karl, supra note 13, at 141; LEGAL SysrE'Ms, supra note 134, at 312.
206. 5A MODERN LEGAL SYSTMS CYCLOPEDIA 100.5 (Kenneth R. Redden, ed. 1990).
"The Prophet started his mission in Mecca in 610 A.D. to establish a social order based
on Divine Revelation with the goal of correcting the spiritual and social ills then in
existence there." Id.; see WEERzmANRY, supra note 171, at 3-5 (discussing Prophet Mo-
hammed and beginnings of Islamic law and religion).
207. Saudis Accept, supra note 2, at 26. King Fahd issued the decree authorizing
accession to the New York Convention. Id.
208. Karl, supra note 13, at 142.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 142.
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differ significantly from Western contracting principles.2 1 1 The
first is usurious interest ("Riba"). 12 The law of Islam forbids
Riba based on the belief that obtaining something for nothing is
inherently immoral and wrong.218 The prohibition of Riba im-
plies that any contract that charges an unusually high interest
rate214 or builds in an excessive profit margin will be void as un-
conscionable, oppressive, and exploitative.215 A contract con-
taining Riba will not be enforced by a Saudi Arabian court.21 6
A second Islamic contracting concept that differs from
Western contract law is the concept of risk ("Gharar). 217
Gharar prohibits gambling.218 Any contract containing specula-.
tion, or contract clause that turns on the happening of a speci-.
fled but unsure event, is void under the principle of Gharar.21 9
Accordingly, any corporation that intends to have its contract
enforceable under the rules and procedures of Saudi Arabia
211. Id. at 167. International disputes often arise because a non-Saudi Arabian
party and a Saudi Arabian party hold differing views and beliefs as to the requirements
and enforceability of the contract. I These disputes often raise choice of law ques-
tions because a contract which may be valid under the rules of one jurisdiction may be
void under the rules of another. Id.; Turck, supra note 15, at 416.
212. Karl, supra note 13, at 151-52; see Peter D. Sloane, The Status ofIslamic Law in
the Modem Commercial World, 22 Irr'L LAw. 743, 745 (1988) (defining Riba as unearned
or unjust profit); Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Ramp, 116 S.W.2d 1144, 1149 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) (defining usurious interest). Usury is the "[ciharging (of] an illegal
rate of interest." Bt.AcK's LAw Di-roNARY 1545 (6th ed. 1990). "The reserving and
taking, or contracting to reserve and take, either directly or by indirection, a greater
sum for the use of money than the lawful interest." Id. A "usurious contract" is a "con..
tract where interest to be paid exceeds the rate established by the statue." I&
213. Karl, supra note 13, at 152; NoE.LJ. COULSON, CoMimacuLx. LAW iN Tnm Gut"
STATES: Tim IsLAMc LEcAL TRADmON 103 (1984).
214. Sloane, supra note 212, at 748. Technically, contracts calling for any type of
interest payment are void under the principle of Riba. I Several methods of ob-
taining interest without violating Islamic law, however, have been developed. Id. The
double sale is one such financing device.
This device establishes a loan with interest when a debtor sells property to a
creditor for cash. The debtor then immediately buys the property back from
the creditor for more money, which will be paid later. The debt owed to the
creditor is effectively a loan, with the higher price for the property in the sec-
ond sale operating as interest, and the property the creditor holds functioning
as collateral.
Karl, supra note 13, at 154-55.
215. WEERAmv, supra note 171, at 67.
216. Karl, supra note 13, at 152.
217. Sloane, supra note 212, at 745-46. Sloane defines Gharar as risk. Id. at 745.
218. Id. The legal doctrine of Gharar prohibits gambling and thus voids any con-
tract involving speculation. Id.
219. Id.
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must be specific in all terms of the contract.220
One of the speculation practices prohibited by Gharar is in-
surance.221 Islamic law rejects insurance under the principles of
Gharar,222 finding that insurance contracts are speculative.223
Because policyholders do not benefit unless there is a loss, and a
loss is not a guaranteed event, the contract is void as being ill-
defined or speculative. 224 The Saudi Arabian government, how-
ever, realizing that insurance companies play a major role in
modem commerce and industry, has recently relaxed its restric-
tive policies regarding insurance.225 Saudi Arabia now permits
parties to utilize insurance as an investment tool, so long as the
insurance companies invest all insurance profits within the bor-
ders of Saudi Arabia. 28
Finally, the Saudi Arabian approach to the remedies
awarded for a breach of contract differs from the approaches
adopted by Western jurisdictions.22 Saudi Arabian jurists are
not bound by the principle of stare decisis.228 As a result, Saudi
Arabian awards and remedies are often inconsistent.229 A Saudi
Arabian judge may award the remedy he considers appropriate
to the situation, with little or no regard to prior judicial deci-
220. Id. A contract must set forth the goods to be delivered, the nature of all
services, and the exact method of payment and delivery. Id.
221. Id. at 749.
222. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (defining Gharar).
223. Sloane, supra note 212, at 749-50.
224. Id.
225. C.E. Acker, The Insurance Business, MWDLE E. Exzc. R.s,, July 1982, at 25.
226. Id. The Saudi Arabian government requires private insurance companies to
invest their profit in land development or business enterprises with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Id. Moreover, in 1986 the government began to recognize the use of
cooperative insurance, wherein each policyholder is a partner in the company and all
company funds are invested. Id. at 26. This type of insurance is not seen as immoral
because there is no Riba. Id. In the case of loss the policyholder recovers, and if there
is not loss the policyholder receives a return on his investment. Id There is no uncer-
tainty of return. Id. "The cooperative is strictly a non-profit organization designed to
meet the need for insurance without compromising Islamic principles." Id.
227. Sloane, supra note 212, at 746-47.
228. Karl, supra note 13, at 149-50. Home v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Civ.
Ct. App. Tex. 1940). Stare decisis is defined as "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided
cases.... A doctrine that, when a court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all
future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same." BLAcK's LAw DianoNARv 1406 (6th ed. 1991).
229. Sloane, supra note 212, at 747.
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sions. 3 ° Because Islam forbids Riba,231 however, Saudi Arabian
courts generally limit damage awards to immediate, measurable
losses.23 2 As a result, Saudi Arabian awards for breaches of con-
tract are significantly lower than the awards that would result for
comparable breaches in common law courts.233
D. Saudi Arabia's International Law
There is no Islamic international law.234 If Saudi Arabia
were to develop a purely Islamic international policy, the policy's
goal would be to create a global Islamic community sharing one
mutual belief in the religion and law of Islam.2 5 This Islamic
theory of assimilation to one global belief23 6 is diametrically op-
posed to the Western theory of international law, which holds
that international peace and coexistence arise from the mutual
understanding and acceptance of differing beliefs and philoso-
phies.23 7
230. Id.
231. Karl, supra note 13, at 151-52; see supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text
(discussing Saudi Arabian prohibition of Riba).
232. Karl, supra note 13, at 162. "Since only God can foresee the future, it would
be inappropriate for [Islamic] ... courts to award damages based on anticipated prof-
its." Id. The Islamic courts can "require the terminating party to make some equitable
reparation for the other party's immediate losses, but they are unlikely to make him
whole by western standards. This is because [Islamic law] ... does not recognize the
concept of consequential damages." Sloane, supra note 212, at 746-47.
233. Sloane, supra note 212, at 746. "The courts may require the terminating party
to make some reparation for the other party's immediate losses, but the aggrieved party
will not receive the damages available to Western plaintiffi." Karl, supra note 13, at 162.
234. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 858.
235. Id. at 860.
Islamic international law, like all Islamic law, has a substantive aspiration: to
realize the command of God.... Unlike the aggregate of individuals pre-
sumed... by public international law, [Islam] . . . is a community, held to-
gether by shared belief. Islamic international law thus ultimately aspires to
global community, aspires to be the vehicle through which Islam becomes the
world.
Id.
236. I& at 829. Islamic law does not separate law and belief. Id. "For Islamic
scholars, international law is a continual attempt to reconcile Islamic authority and
Western category." Id.
237. Id. "The solution that public [Western] international law offers is the idea
that peace arises not from shared belief, but from an order that allows for different
beliefs." Id. at 828-29. "Western law aspires to be coherent, a closed system.... West-
ern law is a language that mediates between abstract purposes, justice, and particular
facts, but law itself is neither the impulse nor the object of speech. In contrast, [Is-
lamic] ... law does not communicate, but is itself the figure ofjustice." Id. at 873; see
generally Ministry of Commerce, Companies Dept., Circular No. 31/1/331/91, dated 3/
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Saudi Arabia's traditional rejection of Western international
law is partially based on its belief that Western countries adopt
treaties and international conventions to benefit their own self-
interest and not to aid other nations or peoples.238 Nations are
motivated by their own self-interest in power, economics, de-
fense, or politics.2 19 The law of Islam rejects this self-interest be-
cause it believes that self-interest or self-gain is inherently selfish
and evil.210
Saudi Arabian courts do not recognize the laws of non-do-
mestic jurisdictions.241. Islamic law is the controlling law in all
Saudi Arabian courts.242 Any international dispute arising with
the Saudi Arabian government is relegated to Saudi Arabian liti-
gation, as other methods of dispute resolution are prohibited by
Saudi Arabian law.24 Saudi Arabian private corporations are al-
lowed to utilize alternative methods of dispute resolution such as
13/1399 (Oct. 10, 1979); see Turck, supra note 15, at 417 n.3 (discussing Circular No.
31/1/331/91, dated 3/13/1399 (Oct 10, 1979)).
238. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 868.
(P]ublic international law is compromised from the outset, and cannot plausi-
bly claim to derive from righteousness. In the view of the West, were right-
eousness available, international law would be unnecessary. It is only because
the international environment is characterized as the state of nature that states
seek to order politics through treaties, through the webs of their own consent.
States consent [to international treaties] because it is in their own self-interest
to do so. Law is thus derived from evil, the human proclivity to violent self-
interest, rather than from righteousness.
Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.; see supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing Islamic belief
that Western states consent to international treaties because of self-interest and not
righteousness).
241. Turck, supra note 15, at 416.
As a general rule, Saudi Courts and regulations do not recognize the concept
of conflict of laws.... Consequently, if a commercial contract provides for a
governing law that is not Saudi law, a Saudi court that takes jurisdiction of the
dispute under that contract will ignore the choice of law and apply Saudi law.
Id.
242. Id at 418. Inasmuch as non-Saudi Arabian corporations are subject to Saudi
Arabian law and policies, a non-Saudi Arabian individual doing business in Saudi Ara-
bia would not attempt to resolve commercial disputes in Islamic Courts. Id. at 417.
243. Id. at 417; see Royal Decree No. M/46, supra note 22 (indicating that parties
may not arbitrate unless prior approval has been received from Saudi Arabian govern-
ment); MEMORANDUM ON AarrRArroN, supra note 166 (seeking public announcement
that invalidates contract provisions that call for arbitration outside Saudi Arabia); De-
cree No. 58, supra note 21 (restricting rights of Saudi Arabian governmental agencies to
submit to arbitration).
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arbitration.244 These methods, however, have to be conducted
within Saudi Arabia, pursuant to Saudi Arabian law.2"
E. Saudi Arabia's Use of Arbitration
The Saudi Arabian government has historically rejected in-
ternational arbitration models as methods of international com-
mercial dispute resolution. 46 Saudi Arabian arbitration, how-
ever, is widely accepted and encouraged as a means of resolving
domestic disputes.247 Saudi Arabia believes that mutual reconcil-
iation is the best method of dispute resolution and therefore
generally prefers both negotiation and arbitration to litiga-
tion.24 8
Arbitration as a means of international dispute resolution
has been restricted by the Saudi Arabian government. 249  In
1963, Saudi Arabia promulgated a law2"' that prohibited govern-
ment agencies from submitting certain types of contract disputes
to private arbitration. 25 ' In addition, in 1983, Saudi Arabia
passed an arbitration regulation, 5 2 further restricting the Saudi
244. Turck, supra note 15, at 417.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 20-23 (discussing Saudi Arabian restrictions on use of arbitra-
don).
247. Pompeo, supra note 166, at 840.
248. Id. The Saudi Arabian standard dispute clause provides that "a]ll disputes
arising from the fulfillment of this Contract and which can not be mutuaUy resolved be-
tween the two parties shall be referred to the Board of Grievances for its final judgment."
Id. The reference to settlement "demonstrates a preference for pursuing expeditious
negotiation as a first step to dispute resolution." Id. A contract containing a method of
dispute resolution would be void in Saudi Arabia based on the principle of Gharar.
Sloane, supra note 212, at 751; see supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text (discussing
Gharar). Whether or not a future dispute will arise involves speculation and therefore
should be unenforceable. Id. Saudi Arabia, however, has "adopted arbitration regula-
tions which specify that arbitration clauses in contracts are enforceable." Karl, supra
note 13, at 164; Royal Decree No. M/40, supra note 22.
249. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing Saudi Arabia's histor-
ical resistance to international arbitration).
250. Decree No. 58, supra note 21; Pompeo, supra note 166, at 841; Berge Se-
trakian, Arbitration Under the Legal System of the Middle East Countries, MIDDLE E. ExEC.
REP., Dec. 1978, at 10. The Council of Ministers promulgated a decree permitting gov-
ernment agencies and corporations to submit to an arbitration providing non-Saudi
Arabian jurisdiction only if the Saudi Arabian government determined, prior to the
arbitration, that the arbitration would be to the government's advantage. I& (citations
omitted).
251. Pompeo, supra note 166, at 841.
252. Royal Decree No. M/46, supra note 22; Allam, supra note 23, at 9 (noting that
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Arabian government's use of arbitration.253 Until Saudi Arabia's
adoption of the New York Convention, therefore, arbitration did
not provide a viable option for the resolution of governmental
disputes arising out of international commercial contracts. 254
Private Saudi Arabian corporations, unlike the Saudi Ara-
bian governmental agencies, are not barred from the interna-
tional arbitration process. 255 In fact, arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution between private parties contracting within
Saudi Arabia is encouraged by the Saudi Arabian government. 25
Until Saudi Arabia's adoption of the New York Convention,257
however, Saudi Arabian policy required non-domestic contrac-
tors submitting to arbitration within Saudi Arabia to follow the
laws of Saudi Arabia.2 8 Non-Saudi Arabian corporations were
therefore resistant to Saudi Arabian arbitration for the same rea-
son that they rejected Saudi Arabian litigation: the Saudi Ara-
bian arbitral process favored the Saudi Arabian party.259 Fur-
ther, any non-Saudi Arabian award holder seeking enforcement
against assets held within Saudi Arabia was required to submit
the award to a Saudi Arabian court.20 The Saudi Arabian court,
applying Saudi Arabian law, would conduct its own investigation
to determine whether to enforce the award.26' Prior to the
Saudi Arabian government's adoption of the New York Conven-
tion, Saudi Arabian courts generally refused to enforce non-
Saudi Arabian arbitral awards.262
Decree No. M/46 prohibited all government agency arbitration unless arbitration re-
ceived approval of President of Council of Ministers prior to initiation).
253. Allam, supra note 23, at 9.
254. Pompeo, supra note 166, at 841; see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text
(discussing Saudi Arabian restrictions on government use of international arbitration).
255. Pompeo, supra note 166, at 841.
256. Turck, supra note 15, at 417.
257. Saudis Accept, supra note 2, at 26.
258. Turck, supra note 15, at 416.
259. Id. In addition,
(c]hoice of law provisions can also be deceptive in that Saudi courts and regu-
lations do not usually recognize Western conflicts of laws principles. Thus, if a
commercial contract states that [non-Saudi Arabian] law controls, the Saudi
court that bean a dispute under that contract may disregard the provision and
apply Saudi law instead.
Karl, supra note 13, at 167.
260. Karl, supra note 13, at 165.
261. Id.; Sloane, supra note 212, at 765.
262. Sloane, supra note 212, at 765; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Saudi Arabian court resolution in favor of Saudi Arabian party).
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IT. ARTICLE V(2)(b) SHOULD BE MODIFIED BECAUSE IT
ALLOWS A COUNTRY TO REFUSE ENFORCEMENT
OF NON-DOMESTIC ARBITRAL AWARDS
Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention allows a coun-
try to adhere to the international arbitration process, while per-
mitting it to reject any arbitral award that is contrary to its public
policy.263 The public policy defense set forth in Article V(2) (b)
of the New York Convention thus permits the circumvention of
the Convention's objective: the uniform enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards .2  As this circumvention is contrary to the goals
of the international community, the New York Convention
should be amended to remove Article V(2) (b), thus giving the
Convention its intended effect.
A. The New York Convention Does Not Require Saudi Arabia to
Enforce Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards
Saudi Arabia's adoption of the New York Convention re-
mains consistent with its historical resistance to international ar-
bitration. 265 The New York Convention provides a vehicle for
the recognition of international commercial arbitral awards,
266
thus accomplishing Saudi Arabia's goal of modernizing its inter-
national dispute resolution methods.2 67 At the same time, Arti-
cle V(2) (b) of the New York Convention provides a safe harbor
wherein Saudi Arabia does not have to recognize a non-Saudi
Arabian arbitral award that is contrary to its public policy.268 Ar-
ticle V(2) (b) allows Saudi Arabia to embrace the international
community and its rules for international dispute resolution and
enforcement, without rejecting its own history and public pol-
icy.269 Thus, Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention allows
Saudi Arabia to accomplish both of its current needs: (1) the
263. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
264. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text (discussing drafters' objectives
in promulgating New York Convention).
265. See supra notes 246-62 and accompanying text (discussing Saudi Arabia's his-
torical resistance to international arbitration).
266. See supra note 28 (outlining New York Convention).
267. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Saudi Arabian move to
join international community).
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need to modernize in the international community;2 70 and (2)
the need to maintain its history and religious beliefs.271
A problem arises for non-Saudi Arabian investors and con-
tractors who choose to do business with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Ara-
bia's adoption of the New York Convention is intended to give
the international community security in commercial contracts
with Saudi Arabia,272 and confirmation that disputes will be adju-
dicated fairly.273 In addition, the New York Convention is meant
to assure non-Saudi Arabian investors and contractors that an
arbitration award issued in any signatory jurisdiction will be en-
forced in Saudi Arabia.274 Article V(2) (b) of the New York Con-
vention, however, appears to nullify this assurance by permitting
Saudi Arabia to reject all arbitral awards that are against its pub-
lic policy.2 75 As Saudi Arabian law and policy is diametrically op-
posed to the rules and laws of many member nations, 276 Saudi
Arabian courts may ,find it easy to reject non-domestic arbitral
awards pursuant to New York Convention Article V(2) (b).27 In
essence, Saudi Arabia may not be required to enforce any more
non-domestic arbitral awards than it did prior to its 1994 acces-
sion to the New York Convention. 2
78
Although Article*V(2) (b) of the New York Convention per-
mits Saudi Arabia to accomplish its dual goals of gaining needed
acceptance by the international community and maintaining its
270. See supra notes 6-16 (commenting on Saudi Arabia's need to modernize its
international dispute resolution methods in order to attract non-domestic investment).
271. See supra notes 246-62 (discussing Saudi Arabia's traditional resistance to in-
ternational arbitration).
272. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (indicating that Saudi Arabia is
strengthening its international policies to increase its attractiveness to non-domestic
investors).
273. Strub, supra note 3, at 1036; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text
(indicating that Saudi Arabia adopted the New York Convention to gain confidence of
non-Saudi Arabian investors).
274. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. HI, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of the New York
Convention).
275. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42; see supra notes 110-65 and accompanying text (discussing New York
Convention Article V(2) (b)).
276. See supra notes 211-33 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
Saudi Arabia and Western commercial contracting).
277. New York Convention,, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
278. See supra notes 246-62 and accompanying text (discussing Saudi Arabia's his-
torical resistance to enforcement of non-Saudi Arabian arbitral awards).
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historic law and religion, this provision defeats the purpose of
the New York Convention as a whole.279 The New York Conven-
tion was promulgated to give the international community a
method for requiring signatories to enforce the arbitral awards
of other member nations.280 Article V(2) (b) affords member na-
tions the ability to circumvent the statute and refuse to enforce
the awards that they have consented to uphold.8 1
B. Possible Modifications of Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention
For rules of law to be effective, whether local or interna-.
tional, they must have the power of enforcement.282 Article
V(2) (b) of the New York Convention eviscerates the New York
Convention's enforcement requirements, 283 leaving the New
York Convention without force and effect. Therefore, the public
policy provision must be revised to limit its ability to circumvent
the purpose of the New York Convention.2
1. Narrow Construction of the Public Policy Defense
Many countries, in an attempt to give the New York Conven-
tion fuller effect, have chosen to give Article V(2) (b) a narrow
reading.285 For example, the United States, Kuwait, and Syria
279. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of New York Con-
vention).
280. NewYork Convention, supra note 1, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of New York Con-
vention).
281. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42; see supra notes 110-65 and accompanying text (discussing application of
Article V(2) (b) of New York' Convention).
282. See Strub, supra note 3, at 1042 (discussing importance of effective arbitral
award enforcement); see supra note 32 and accompanying text (indicating that success-
ful international legislation requires effective enforcement).
283. NewYork Convention, supra note 1, art. m, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40 (discussing New York Convention's enforcement requirements); see supra notes 110-
12 and accompanying text (discussing member state's ability to void international arbi-
tration awards under Article V(2) (b) of New York Convention).
284. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of New York
Convention).
285. See supra notes 113-65 and accompanying text (indicating that several nations
have given Article V defenses narrow readings in order to increase New York Conven-
tion's effectiveness); see, eg., Matlin, supra note 44, at 151 (indicating that U.S. courts
enforce non-U.S. arbitral awards wherever possible).
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have embraced the New York Convention,288 subordinating their
own rules of civil procedure to the New York Convention's poli-
cies.287 In addition, U.S. courts have held that all New York Con-
vention defenses should be given a narrow reading, to be effec-
tive only when award enforcement would violate the most funda-
mental notion of justice.288 Saudi Arabia, with its need to gain
the confidence of the international commercial community,28 9
may choose to give the public policy defense set forth in Article
V(2) (b) of the New York Convention a narrow reading.290
2. Amend the Convention's Public Policy Defense
Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention could be
amended to provide that a signatory, finding a foreign arbitral
award contrary to its public policy, could seek nullification of the
award by a third and neutral body such as the American Arbitra-
tion Association ("AAA"). 291 Permitting a third party to make
286. New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see Inter-
national Legal Framew, *, supra nbte 1 (indicating dates that United States, Kuwait, and
Syria acceded to New York Convention); see supra notes 110-65 and accompanying text
(discussing United States, Kuwaiti, and Syrian acceptance and adherence to New York
Convention).287. Haardt v. Binzagr, No. CIVA.H-83-5846, 1986 WL 14836, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 1986)
288. See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text (discussing United States re-
strictions on New York Convention defenses).
289. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussing international com-
munity's hesitation in contracting with Saudi Arabia).
290. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2) (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 350
U.N.T.S. at 42.
291. See American Arbitration Association, Questions & Answers, 1. The American
Arbitration Association is a U.S., non-profit organization which administers and devel-
ops arbitration rules and proceedings. Id.
Under its charter, the Association's functions are: to organize the knowledge
of arbitration, to provide a basic literature, to promote instruction in the sub-
ject, to carry on the research necessary for this purpose and to create national,
inter-American, and international systems of arbitration and to provide and
maintain services and facilities therefor.
Id.; see also Lucius Root Eastman, Address at the Association's Labor-Management Din-
ner (Nov. 23, 1942), in AAA ARBrrRATON BmuoGRAPHY forward (1954). Lucius East-
man, President of the American Arbitration Association from 1927-1933, and 1935-
1937, states:
I think voluntary arbitration is to all of us less of a procedure than it is a
symbol of the peace on earth and goodwill toward men which exists in the
hearts of all Americans in this great struggle for freedom which now encom-
passes the world. Many of us believe that in arbitration we have a concept that
stands out in opposition to war. We believe that a science of arbitration can be
equally well organized and intelligently administered and that under the ban-
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the determination as to the award's acceptability in the enforc-
ing jurisdiction would provide Article V(2) (b) with its missing
element of impartiality. Determination by a neutral third party
would ensure that signatories would not use Article V(2) (b) as
an excuse to refuse enforcement of non-domestic arbitral
awards.
3. Remove the Convention's Public Policy Defense
Complete removal of New York New York Convention Arti-
cle V(2) (b) would not leave a party opposing the enforcement of
a foreign arbitral award without a remedy. 92 A party who be-
lieves that a non-domestic award is unjust may invoke the re.-
maining provisions of New York Convention Article V to ques-
tion the validity of the award.293 Further, pursuant to the New
York Convention, the party may move to have the award an-
nulled or set aside in the country where it was rendered.294 Ab-
solute removal of Article V(2) (b) would eliminate an enforcing
nation's arbitrary denial of foreign arbitral awards. This elimina-
tion would provide the international community with security
that: (1) an arbitral award represents the end of the dispute res-
olution process; and (2) enforcement will be effectuated by all
member nations.
CONCLUSION
Time may reveal that Saudi Arabia will adhere to the terms
of the New York Convention without utilizing Article V(2) (b) to
circumvent the requirement that it recognize and enforce non-
Saudi Arabian arbitral awards. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia can ef-
ner of arbitration the scattered forced of those who strive for peace can be
united. But to be effective, the concept of voluntary arbitration must be vital-
ized. We must organize it scientifically. We must through education and ac-
tual performance bring its potential values home to every American and
through him to the world of which he is betoming so large a part.
Id.
292. See Lamm, supra note 37, at 278 (discussing remedies available to parties op-
posing arbitral award enforcement).
293. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at
42; see supra note 28 and accompanying text (listing other Article V defenses to enforce-
ment of non-domestic arbitration awards).
294. Lamm, supra note 37, at 278. "As opposed to simply opposing enforcement,
the losing party to-an arbitration can also take the initiative to have the award annulled
or set aside in the country where it was rendered." IL at 278.
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fectively nullify the terms of the New York Convention by invok-
ing Article V(2) (b). This scenario evidences that Article V(2) (b)
needs to be either modified or removed from the New York Con-
vention. Modification or removal of Article V(2) (b) will provide
the international community with a set of rules requiring New
York Convention signatories to enforce all foreign arbitral
awards, which is the true purpose of the Convention.
